Abstract. We study the roles of message components in authentication protocols. In particular, we investigate how a certain component contributes to the task of achieving entity authentication. To this aim, we isolate a core set of roles that enables us to extract general principles that should be followed to avoid attacks. We then formalize these principles in terms of rules for protocol parties and we prove that protocols designed according to these rules will achieve entity authentication.
Introduction
Security protocols, also known as cryptographic protocols, are designed to reach specific security goals in (possibly) hostile environments, like, e.g., Internet. Typical goals include the communication of a secret between two trusted entities, an authenticated message exchange, the generation and the sharing of a session key, the authentication of an entity with respect to another entity (e.g., to a server), and more.
The design of security protocols is complex and often error prone, as witnessed by the many attacks to long standing protocols reported in the recent literature on the subject (see, e.g., [6, 8, 13, 16, 19, 20] ). Most of these attacks do not need to break cryptography to be performed. Indeed, even when cryptography is assumed as a fully reliable building-block, an intruder can engage a number of potentially dangerous actions: it can intercept messages before they reach their destination, insert new messages, read those that travel along the communication links and forge new ones using the knowledge it has previously gained. All these actions are available to an intruder willing to try and break a protocol by exploiting a flaw in the underlying protocol logic.
In this paper, we focus on (shared-key based) cryptographic protocols for entity authentication, i.e. on protocols that enable one entity to prove its claimed identity to another entity [14, 18, 9] , and discuss a novel method to protect such protocols from attacks to their logic.
A typical source of flaws in security protocols, and specifically in authentication protocols, is a poor interpretation of messages, whereby certain messages are believed to convey more guarantees than they really do. As observed in [2] "every message should say what it means, i.e., its interpretation should depend only on its content". As a trivial example of a message exchange that fails to comply with this principle consider the protocol:
A B : "Here I am!" K AB in which Alice is sending to Bob the message "Here I am!" encrypted with a longterm key shared between them. When Bob receives the message, he could erroneously deduce that it has been generated by Alice since it is encrypted with a key that only Alice (besides Bob himself) knows. However, this is not true if Bob previously ran the same protocol with Alice (with exchanged roles). In that case, the following, well-known, reflection attack could be exploited by an intruder E: aµ B E´Aµ : "Here I am!" K AB bµ E´Aµ B : "Here I am!" K AB
In the first run a, E pretends to be A (denoted with E´Aµ) and intercepts the message sent by Bob; in the second run b, E´Aµ replays the same message back to Bob. As a consequence, B erroneously interprets his own message as sent by Alice. The problem is that Bob is assuming that the message has been generated by Alice without this being explicitly indicated in the message. A simple solution is to provide this additional information within the message, as in A B : A "Here I am!" K AB , where the first component now signals that A is the 'claimant' of the protocol.
Motivated by this need to make the interpretation of messages unambiguous, we investigate the roles of message components in authentication protocols. In particular, we study how entity identifiers, associated with the entity roles in the protocols, contribute to the task of achieving entity authentication. We identify three fundamental roles:´iµ Claimant, the role of a principal willing to authenticate itself to some other principal;
iiµ Intended verifier: the role of a principal that a claimant wants to act as a verifier for its response;´iiiµ Key owner: the role of a principal that owns a session key. These roles apply well, and uniformly, for a wide class of entity authentication protocols.
We propose a number of principles to be followed by the trusted parties of a protocol. These principles formalize provably safe ways for generating new encrypted blocks containing roles -called authentication blocks -from existing ones, and provide a formal basis for reasoning on authentication in terms of the authentication guarantees that are provided by decrypting such special blocks. For example, a trusted server S can assign to an entity A the claimant role in a message directed to another entity B, provided it has enough information to guarantee to B that A is indeed the claimant, i.e., provided that S has decrypted an authentication block stating that A is willing to authenticate with B. Dually, if an entity B decrypts a block where A is playing the claimant role, then he is guaranteed that A is indeed the identity of the claimant and that A was recently running the authentication protocol with him, i.e., A is authenticated to B.
We formalize these principles in terms of rules for protocol parties and we prove that protocols designed according to these rules will achieve entity authentication.
The rest of the presentation is organized as follows. § 2 describes the general assumptions of the model we work with, and introduces the notion of authentication block. § 3 defines the design principles, formalized as inference rules, and illustrates them with several examples. § 4 concludes with final remarks and a discussion on related work.
Protocol Roles and Authentication Blocks
As we stated in the introduction, our focus is on protecting protocols from attacks that are based on flaws in the protocols' logic and do that not exploit any weakness of the underlying cryptographic primitives. We thus make the so called perfect cryptography assumption, i.e. we abstract away from security issues regarding cryptographic primitives and specific cryptographic algorithms, and we assume every cryptographic operation to be a secure building-block. Moreover we assume that keys are carefully managed, i.e., long-term keys are safely distributed to participants and can never be learned by any intruder and, similarly, session keys are never circulated within messages once they have been first distributed.
Authentication protocols can be partitioned into two classes depending on whether or not they are based on a Trusted Third Party (TTP), i.e., a trusted entity that acts as intermediate party for the authentication task. As we shall see, our principles allow us to deal with both kinds of authentication in a uniform way.
The following conventions are assumed throughout. The capital letters A and B denote protocol principals, which are distinguished from TTPs denoted by S. Instead, we use I and J to refer to generic participants in the protocol, either principals or TTP's. We use K and N to denote keys and nonces, respectively. The notation K IJ indicates a long-term key shared between I and J. We assume that K IJ K JI . Finally, V is used to denote either a key or a nonce and Ê ranges over the roles Ð Ñ Î Ö and ÇÛÒ Ö.
As discussed earlier, we consider three possible roles that entities can play during the authentication task: Claimant, Intended verifier, and Key owner. There are other message components that are necessary to make these roles useful for the purpose of authentication. In particular, each role needs a time-dependent element, like e.g., nonces, timestamps, sequence numbers, that provides freshness. Here we only consider nonces, i.e., numbers that are used only once: they are typically generated as challenges, and sent back inside encrypted messages, to be checked and thus prove that a certain message is not a replay of an old one. Together with nonces, we associate entities with the session key they possess (this is always true of entities playing the Key owner role). This is useful for distribution of session keys, where a trusted server wants to communicate that a certain entity owns a certain session key.
Authentication blocks are abstractions of encrypted messages which only contain the message components that are directly relevant to authentication, plus the role of such components in the authentication task. Formally, The use of roles and nonces within authentication blocks conveys useful information and guarantees to any entity which successfully decrypts them. Specifically, assume that entity I 1 decrypts the authentication block Ê I N K K I 1 I 2 and checks the nonce N (it had previously generated), and let I 1 I 2 . Then the following can be inferred: "Entity I is the owner of the fresh key K (if K is present), and is recently playing the role Ê with respect to I 1 and I 2 ", that is: In all the remaining cases, no guarantee can be made based on the decryption of the block.
As we mentioned earlier, "checking the nonce" provides the freshness guarantees on authentication blocks that are needed to counter replay attacks. Also note that guarantees are provided by decrypting authentication blocks only in some specific situations.
In particular, since the Ð Ñ role is used to authenticate I to I 1 (possibly through a TTP), we require I 1 to be a party other than a TTP and that I 1 I, i.e., that I 1 does not accept authentication requests from itself (which is a typical source of "reflection attacks"). Since the Î Ö role is used by I 2 to communicate to a TTP I 1 that I 2 itself intends to authenticate with I, we ask that I 1 be a TTP and that I be different from the other two identities. Finally, the assumption that I 1 I 2 implies that we disregard all issues related to self-authentication.
Example 1.
We illustrate the use of authentication blocks in reasoning on the interpretation of messages and in making their interpretation unambiguous. Consider a message M A N K BS encrypted with a long-term key shared between principal B and TTP S, and containing a message M, the entity identifier A and a nonce N. One can deduce that this message is probably used to authenticate something, as a nonce is present, but nothing more can be said from the message itself. If instead, we represent it as an authentication block, we recover a precise, and unambiguous semantics. B to authenticate with A through the TTP S. Note that we cannot map the message to a block of the form ÇÛÒ Ö A N K K BS as no session key K is present in the message and K is mandatory for role ÇÛÒ Ö. In other words, to see a message as an authentication block, we need that every element required by the block is present in the original message. Note also that M is "discarded" in authentication blocks. This reflects the fact that it is irrelevant for entity authentication.
Principles for Entity Authentication
The formalization of our principles draws on a trace-based model that we adopt for describing protocol executions. The principles are stated as inference rules that specifý iµ the format of the ciphertexts that a trusted party should generate to complete an authentication session, and´iiµ the conditions under which such ciphertexts should be generated to provide the intended authentication guarantees. The ciphertexts can be in two forms: either authentication blocks encrypted with long-term keys (which we assume to be robust) or any other message encrypted with session keys which are possessed by the trusted parties, and are only circulated among them within authentication blocks.
The inference rules predicate the generation of new messages or actions by each trusted principal on´iµ previous actions by the same principal and´iiµ on the structure of the ciphertexts that principal received at earlier stages of the protocol. Hence, the rules effectively assume that all the ciphertexts reach all parties, included their intended recipients. This may at first be understood as a limitation on the power of the intruder, because it prevents attacks to be mounted based on the interception (i.e., subtraction from the net) of ciphertexts. This is not the case, however, as intercepting a message may only break liveness properties, such as fairness in contract-signing, where two parties seek guarantees that none of them will get the contract signed before the other one (see, e.g., [21, 25] ). Authentication, instead, is (formalized as) a safety property, which is immune to attacks based on message interception. We start by formalizing the notion of safety.
Traces, markers and events
We represent (possibly concurrent) protocol runs in terms of traces that collect the sequence of encrypted messages generated during the runs as well as additional marker actions that we use to state our safety result. The structure of traces is defined as follows:
represent the generation by entity I of M K and Ê J N K K I 1 I 2 , respectively. As for the markers, they are not part of the protocol runs: we include them in the traces to help define the desired safety property. Specifically, check´I Nµ indicates the checking of the nonce N by the entity I. Marker run Ê´I1 I 2 µ indicates the intention of (equivalently, the start of a protocol run by) I 1 to authenticate itself with I 2 , by exploiting the role Ê. Note that there might be many run Ê´I1 I 2 µ markers corresponding to many (either parallel or sequential) protocol sessions (but we will require that all have the same role Ê). We write run´B Aµ instead of run Ê´B Aµ when the role Ê is immaterial. Finally, commit´I 1 I 2 µ marks the completion of the authentication session. We can now define the desired property of entity authentication in terms of a correspondence between actions of the participants [24, 17] , checked on the protocol traces. Intuitively, a trace is safe if every commit´A Bµ in the trace is preceded by a corresponding run´B Aµ action. Next, we discuss the rules for forming safe traces.
Definition 2 (Safety

Table 1 Inference Rules
Environments EMPTY / 0 ¥ NEW Γ ¥ V fresh in Γ V key or nonce Γ new´I V µ ¥ Principles ENV Γ ¥ Γ ε PRINCIPLE 1 Γ σ run Ê´A Bµ ¾ σ µ Ê Ð Ñ Γ σ :: run Ð Ñ´A Bµ :: A º Ð Ñ A N K AB PRINCIPLE 2 Γ σ run Ê´A Bµ ¾ σ µ Ê Î Ö Γ σ :: run Î Ö ´A Bµ :: A º Î Ö B N K AS PRINCIPLE 3 Γ new´S Nµ ¥ Γ σ I º Î Ö B N K AS ¾ σ Γ new´S Nµ σ :: check´S Nµ :: S º Ð Ñ A N ¼ K BS PRINCIPLE 4 Γ σ I º Î Ö B N K AS ¾ σ Γ σ :: S º Ð Ñ A N K BS PRINCIPLE 5 Γ new´S Kµ ¥ Γ σ Γ new´S Kµ σ :: S º ÇÛÒ Ö A N A K K BS :: S º ÇÛÒ Ö B N B K K AS PRINCIPLE 6 Γ σ I º ÇÛÒ Ö B N K K AS ¾ σ run Ê´A Bµ ¾ σ µ Ê ÇÛÒ Ö Γ σ :: run ÇÛÒ Ö´A Bµ :: A º M K Authentication Guarantees AUTHENTICATION 1 Γ new´B Nµ ¥ Γ σ J º Ð Ñ A N K IB ¾ σ I ¾ S A Γ new´B Nµ σ :: check´B Nµ :: commit´B Aµ AUTHENTICATION 2 Γ new´B Nµ ¥ Γ σ I º ÇÛÒ Ö A N K K SB ¾ σ J º M K ¾ σ J B Γ new´B Nµ σ :: check´B Nµ :: commit´B Aµ
Principles as Inference Rules
The inference rules, reported in Table 1 , derive judgments of the form Γ σ, where σ is a trace, and Γ is an environment. Environments collect the events of the protocols, i.e. the creation of session keys and nonces:
where new´I V µ traces the generation of the nonce or key V by the entity I. Environments are used in the inference system to ensure the freshness of nonces and session keys. The intuition is as follows: when a new nonce is generated, or a session key created, it is included in the environment. A nonce (key) can only be generated if it does not occur in the current environment. Nonces can be checked, (keys used) only if they are available in the environment, and once a nonce is checked (a key used) the corresponding event is discarded from the environment, and hence it is never available again for checking (usage). The purpose of the inference rules is to generate safe traces, that is traces that provide the intended authentication guarantees for a protocol session. Indeed, we can prove the following result, stating that protocols designed according to our principles do achieve the desired authentication guarantees.
Theorem 1 (Safety). If Γ σ then σ is safe.
We now proceed with the description of the deduction rules. The first block of rules derive auxiliary judgments Γ ¥, that decree environments "well-formed": these rules should be self-explanatory: an environment is well-formed just in case it does not contain duplicate nonces and/or keys. The remaining rules, which formalize our principles, have the following uniform structure:
where σ ¼ extends σ, and define the conditions under which the judgment in the conclusion may be derived from the judgment in the premise by including further actions in the trace. The side conditions only test the presence of certain ciphertexts, and marker actions, in the current trace σ.
Protocols without TTP (direct authentication)
Principal A may authenticate with B by using a long-term key she shares with B.
PRINCIPLE 1 Principal A may start authenticating with principal B by generating an authentication block of the form Ð Ñ A N K AB .
Since this is the start of an authentication session, it is marked by including run Ð Ñ´A Bµ in the current trace. Other concurrent runs run Ê´A Bµ are possible, given that Ê Ð Ñ. Note that this principle is consistent with the intended guarantees provided by decrypting a block with Ð Ñ role. When B decrypts the block Ð Ñ A N K AB , and verifies the nonce N, he is guaranteed that A has initiated an authentication session with him; moreover, if A receives such a message, she will discard it as the block is declaring herself as claimant.
Example 2.
To motivate, consider the following protocol inspired to the ISO symmetrickey, two-pass unilateral authentication protocol [18, 15] :
B, the verifier, sends a freshly generated nonce to A as a challenge. A, the claimant, completes the authentication session by sending a message M, A and N B encrypted using K AB . This proves to B the identity of the claimant A, as only A and B know K AB . Since identifier A represents the claimant of the protocol run, we make this information explicit by mapping message 2 into the authentication block Ð Ñ A N B K AB (note that M is not in the block as it is unessential for authentication). The protocol is a "good one" as it follows principle 1. Interestingly, we can show that failing to comply with the previous principle may lead to protocol flaws. In particular, we consider the cases in which either A or N B are missing in Message 2. In both cases there is no way to represent the message as a valid authentication block as one of the fundamental components is missing. And in both cases the protocol is insecure. Suppose first that A is missing: Message 2 becomes M N B K AB . Observing message M N K AB , there is no way to tell who between A and B is the claimant, so it is impossible to distinguish between messages that belong to a protocol run and messages that belong to another concurrent protocol run with reversed roles. This fact can be used effectively by an adversary as follows:
With such a "reflection attack" an enemy can trick B into believing that A has been actively involved in the protocol run "a", while in fact it has not. As a further example, consider a version of the protocol that disregards the nonce, i.e., one in which message 2) is replaced by the message A M K AB . Here the problem is that there is no way for B to tell if the message belongs to the current run or to a previous one, so an adversary can convince B that it is talking to A without A actively participating:
Protocols with TTP (indirect authentication)
When a TTP is present, Alice may authenticate to Bob using the TTP as a mediator. In this setting, we assume that the only way for Alice and Bob to communicate is via the TTP, with which they share a long-term key. The role Î Ö aims at dealing with this kind of indirect authentication.
The second principle is similar to the previous one, only, it marks the start of the authentication session with run Î Ö ´A Bµ and represents the start of an authentication session through a TTP. Notice that to guarantee that N is never used again in the execution, PRINCIPLE 3 discards the event new´S Nµ from Γ.
Example 3 (nonce-based Wide Mouth Frog Protocol 1 ).
The Wide Mouth Frog protocol [5] achieves unilateral authentication using a TTP. The original version is based on timestamps, here we consider the nonce-based version presented in [11] .
This protocol can be seen as a direct application of principles 2 and 3. As a matter of fact, the two encrypted messages 3 and 6, can be abstracted as the two authentication blocks Î Ö B N S K AS and Ð Ñ A N B K BS , respectively. The latter block provides an authentication guarantee to B. Note that the two encrypted messages have the same form. Assigning them to two different authentication blocks make their interpretation very different and allows us to easily reason about which guarantees the two messages provide.
The next principle captures a variant of authentication forwarding that allows the TTP to forward authentication even if it has not verified the claimant's nonce. The idea is that the nonce sent by the claimant is forwarded to the verifier who is in charge of checking its validity.
PRINCIPLE 4 (Non-verified authentication forwarding) TTP S may declare to a principal B that a principal A has started an authentication session with B, if S has decrypted a block Î Ö B N K AS . To do so, S generates an authentication block of the form Ð Ñ A N K BS .
The difference with respect to principle 3 is that N is not checked by the TTP but is forwarded to B, in order to let him check its validity. This principle is again consistent with the intended semantics of authentication blocks: the TTP is assured that A has started authenticating with B even though it does not know anything about the freshness of this intention; for this reason, the TTP forwards the nonce N to B so that B may check it and verify that the authentication session started by A is also recent. A possible scenario is the following: the nonce is originated by the verifier, sent to the claimant who inserts it into the authentication request to the TTP; finally the nonce is forwarded back to the verifier for the final check. This is what the "Woo and Lam Shared-Key Protocol" does [23] .
Example 4 (Flaws in the original Woo and Lam protocol).
Here we report the original (flawed) version of the protocol [23] .
Message 3 is encrypted with the key shared with S and is thus directed to S (even if it is sent to B who is in charge of forwarding it to S inside message 4). It represents the declaration of the intention of A to authenticate with B. However, note that A does not include in the ciphertext of message 3 the label of B. Thus, it is not possible to apply principle 2. The same happens in the last message, where S does not include any identity label. This makes Principle 4 inapplicable. It is interesting to remark that the corrected version of this protocol [11] uses the identifiers exactly as required by our principles. The principle above shows how the ÇÛÒ Ö role is used: the TTP communicates to A (B)
Protocols with TTP based on session keys
that B (A) owns the key K. Note that, in order to guarantee the secrecy of the session key, we are assuming that the TTP will never send other messages containing K. As in Table 1 , the event new´S Kµ is discarded from Γ to ensure that K is never used again. The next principle allows A to send to B a message encrypted with a session key K. In condition AUTHENTICATION 1 , if I is A, then the authentication request is directly made by A. Otherwise, I must be a TTP, say S, and the request is indirectly made S on behalf of A. A further remark is in order for the side-condition J B in AUTHENTI-CATION 2 . Here we are assuming that B, which is committing (hence completing the authentication session) has the ability to tell that he is not the originator of the ciphertext M K (see, e.g., the Amended Needham Schroeder Shared-Key Protocol [19] ).
Conclusion and Related Work
We have given a in-depth analysis of the roles that message components play in authentication protocols, and we have investigated how a certain component contributes to the task of achieving entity authentication. We identified three simple roles, namely Claimant, Intended verifier and Key owner, that allow us to extract general principles to be followed to protect protocols against attacks. These principles are formalized in terms of rules for protocol parties and lead us to prove that any protocol following these rules (i.e., designed according to the principles) achieves entity authentication.
Our approach should be understood as a first step of the development a new analysis technique for authentication protocols. Our goal is to develop (possibly automated) static analysis of authentication protocols based on the principles explained in this paper. At the present stage, we are able to judge if a certain trace is obtained according to the principles: if this is the case, we are guaranteed that such a trace is safe with respect to a specific notion of entity authentication. The next step is to have a language for specifying cryptographic protocols and a technique for proving that a certain protocol specification is designed according to the principles. This would imply that all the execution traces of the protocol are safe and, consequently, that the protocol guarantees entity authentication. We are presently studying how to obtain this on a language similar to spi calculus [1] .
The formal model we have developed appears to be fairly general, but a number of extensions would be desirable to capture a wider class of protocols. We are currently studying how to extend the model in order to manage asymmetric and nested encryption, and in order to capture other important security properties such as message authentication and key distribution.
The idea of associating to principals the roles played in a cryptographic protocol is not completely new. Drawing on earlier work by Bieber in [4] , in [22] Snekkenes develops a logic for the analysis of cryptographic protocols, to detect multi-role flaws, i.e., flaws that may result from a principal taking on multiple roles during different sessions of a protocol (an instance of this situation is the reflection attack of Example 3, where A plays both the initiator and responder roles). Our idea of role is however appreciably different. In particular, we focus on the role that principals play in an authentication task (e.g. claimant or verifier) instead of considering usual protocol roles like initiator and responder. Notice that reasoning on usual protocol roles does not always give information about "who is willing to authenticate with who". For example in mutual authentication protocols both initiator and responder act as claimant and verifier simultaneously, since in such protocols there are two authentication tasks (the authentication of A to B and vice versa).
In [11, 12] Gordon and Jeffrey provide the spi calculus with a type system for analyzing authentication protocols based on symmetric and asymmetric encryption, respectively. These papers are very related to our work. First, their definition of safety exploits, as we do, the Woo and Lam idea of correspondence assertions [24] . Moreover, as stated above, our final aim is to obtain a static analysis of cryptographic protocols as they already do. There are however several important differences. The underlying idea of using roles and principles for generating authentication blocks is new and seems to be promising for obtaining simpler static analyses. Indeed, type definitions are the only human task required in [11, 12] , but types are quite complex, as the type of nonces keeps all the information regarding authentication tasks between principals. This implies dependent types and forces the use of casting inside processes. Our approach is completely different. We focus on the guarantees that the reception of a given ciphertext, as a whole, gives to a principal and we do not reason about single components. For instance, in our model a nonce does not, by itself, convey any information regarding principals. It is just used for ensuring freshness to the enclosing authentication block. We expect that a static analysis based on these ideas will be simpler as the only human effort required is the binding of every identity label present in a ciphertext to one of the three roles.
Further related work, which aims at reasoning about authentication guarantees provided by messages, is the one based on belief logics, like, e.g., BAN [5] , GNY [10] . The main difference with such an approach is that we do not have any kind of protocol idealization. Indeed, we reason about "concrete" execution traces, directly connected to the structure of ciphertexts. An interesting paper that goes in the direction of eliminating the idealization step of the approaches above is [7] by Durgin, Mitchell and Pavlovic. They propose a logic for proving security properties, which is designed around a process calculus derived from Strand Spaces. The calculus has a semantics based on sets of traces and deals with asymmetric encryption. Our model is not directly comparable with the one proposed in the above mentioned paper, since we consider symmetric encryption and rely on a different formalization of authentication properties. Further work needs to be put in place to gain a deeper understanding of the relationships between the two approaches.
